Legal prism — 2026-09-23

If the landlord has received an excessive amount, the landlord is obliged to repay that amount together with interest under Section 6 of the Interest Act (1975:635) from the date of receipt.

A negotiation meeting must be held within three weeks from the date on which the other party received the request; however, the parties may depart from this by written agreement.

Core issue

When annual rent negotiations reach an impasse, as has now occurred in Värmland, the parties do not face any immediate legal sanction, but rather a procedure in which an arbitrator or rent tribunal ultimately determines the rent, often with retroactive effect. The item is an opinion article by Fastighetsägarna Värmland, and its core point is that the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304) lacks mandatory time limits that make delay costly for the party prolonging the process. The decisive provisions are Section 5 of the Rent Negotiation Act, which imposes on the landlord a duty to negotiate rent increases, and Section 15 of the same Act, which regulates how negotiations are initiated.

Legal assessment

Under Section 15 of the Rent Negotiation Act, a party wishing to negotiate must submit a written request to the other party specifying the issues and proposing a time and place.

• If the parties do not agree, any agreement entered into directly between the landlord and the tenant on rent increase issues is invalid under Section 23 of the Rent Negotiation Act if negotiations under the negotiation framework have not taken place.
• Under Section 11 a of the Act (1973:188) on Regional Tenancy Tribunals and Rent Tribunals, the rent tribunal may not examine the landlord’s claim for higher rent unless negotiations under the negotiation framework have taken place; an exception applies where negotiations were requested but were prevented by circumstances not attributable to the landlord.
• The material contains no case law, and therefore no precedent can be invoked.
• The proposals in the opinion article — a statutory right to refer a dispute to an arbitrator without a separate agreement, a limited negotiation period, and simplified proceedings before the rent tribunal — are proposals for legislative amendment, not current law.

Consequences

For tenants in Värmland, the impasse means continued uncertainty as to the applicable rent, with a risk of a retroactive increase once a decision is issued; the safeguard is that the repayment obligation in the event of an incorrect rent under Section 23 covers the amount together with default interest.

• For property owners, the uncertainty means that revenues remain unclear for large parts of the year, which, according to the article, makes it more difficult to plan maintenance and investments.
• A landlord who has requested negotiations but encountered an obstacle may nevertheless have its claim examined by the rent tribunal under the exception in Section 11 a; otherwise, negotiations are a prerequisite for proceedings.
• Politically, the matter lies with the Riksdag.

According to the Consumer Ombudsman’s application, the fine may be calibrated by reference to lottery revenues of just over SEK 3.5 billion, as stated in the 2025 annual report, which the authority argues supports a relatively high level.

Under Chapter 15, Section 4 of the Gambling Act, marketing that contravenes Section 1 is deemed unfair to consumers for the purposes of Sections 5, 23 and 26 of the Marketing Act (2008:486).

Core issue

Svenska Postkodföreningen faces a procedural hearing before the Patent and Market Court, where the Consumer Ombudsman seeks a prohibition, subject to a conditional fine, against a specific Instagram advertisement. The specific legal issue in dispute is whether an advertising film featuring falling prize cheques, SEK 101 million in gold-coloured text, and a time-limited half-price offer breaches the moderation requirement in Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138). That provision requires moderation to be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers and prohibits marketing from being specifically directed at persons under the age of 18. The Consumer Ombudsman argues that the overall assessment is not satisfied, because the lottery is presented as socially attractive and the offer creates urgency. According to the application, the Gambling Act requires information to be limited to factual details about the lottery and presented as objectively as possible.

Legal assessment

• The assessment is conducted as an overall assessment of the presentation, the time pressure created by the offer, and the social attractiveness taken together.
• The Swedish Consumer Agency’s 2025 general guidelines on gambling marketing are not binding, but a court ruling would carry substantially greater persuasive weight than the guidelines. Case law is sparse, particularly for social media, where formats are short, visual and algorithmically distributed. In autumn 2022, the Riksdag rejected the Government’s proposal for an adjusted moderation requirement in the bill A Strengthened Gambling Regulation, on the ground that case law was still developing. The Court has previously shown itself willing to impose significant conditional fines: in the Consumer Ombudsman’s case against the credit intermediary Advea, the Patent and Market Court attached an interim conditional fine totalling SEK 3.5 million to its decision. That case provides a reference point for the order of magnitude of the fine, although in the present case the Consumer Ombudsman expressly links the level to the gambling operator’s turnover.

[PREJUDIKAT] The materials contain no case law on social-media marketing of gambling other than the Advea case. The Advea judgment shows that the Court accepts conditional fines in the million-kronor range in Consumer Ombudsman cases, but it concerned credit intermediation, not gambling advertising; its relevance to the moderation issue is therefore indirect.

Consequences

For Postkodföreningen, more than the individual conditional fine is at stake: a procedural ruling on what moderation means in social media would shape advertising design across the entire sector.

• For other licence holders in the gambling market, the case means that operative wording concerning the overall assessment of campaigns featuring prize emphasis, urgency and socially attractive elements will have precedential value.
• If the Court upholds the prohibition with a high conditional fine, a practical consequence will be that campaigns with time-limited offers and highlighted prize amounts must be redesigned or abandoned.

The tenant may remain in the apartment with the same security of tenure as a first-hand tenant, because the Supreme Court has now refused Ibrahimovic and Seger leave to appeal, meaning that the Court of Appeal’s judgment stands.

Core issue

The core of the dispute was not the grounds for termination as such, but whether an intermediary letting company could be disregarded as a nominee in relation to the tenant. Both courts found that the legal arrangement had been used to circumvent provisions on security of tenure and reasonable rent that are intended to protect the tenant. The legal issue was determined under Chapter 12 of the Swedish Land Code (1970:994): where a tenancy has been granted through a chain of arrangements intended to circumvent tenancy legislation, the tenant is afforded the same rights as in the case of a direct grant.

Legal assessment

The District Court held that the tenant has the same rights vis-à-vis Ibrahimovic and Seger as if they had granted the tenancy directly to him.

• The Court of Appeal found a community of interest between the couple and the letting company in relation to the tenant.
• The tenant relied on Supreme Court case law and argued that he had paid excessive rent under a nominee arrangement that benefited the property owner.
• According to the court, the submissions made by the couple before the Court of Appeal did not alter the assessment.
• The material contains no specific case with a case number; it states only that Supreme Court case law was invoked by the tenant.

Consequences

The termination is ineffective: the tenant may remain in occupation with the rights attaching to a first-hand tenancy, including protection against termination and reasonable rent under Chapter 12 of the Swedish Land Code.

• For Ibrahimovic and Seger, the judgment means that, in practical terms, they remain the landlords; they cannot recover possession of the apartment without a new legal basis, such as forfeiture or an agreement with the tenant.
• The excessive-rent issue may be examined further, as the tenant has alleged that he paid rent above the permissible level under the nominee arrangement.
• The judgment is significant for other lettings through intermediary companies: nominee structures that circumvent security of tenure may give the tenant direct rights against the true owner.

The couple are liable to reimburse the tenant’s litigation costs in the District Court and the Court of Appeal, totalling SEK 422,000.

This means that the tenant has the same rights as a direct tenant, notwithstanding that he rented as a subtenant through a letting company.

Core issue

The tenant’s legal position is now final: the Court of Appeal’s judgment stands, as the Supreme Court has refused leave to appeal. The legal issue was whether a nominee arrangement, whereby the owner lets the property through an intermediary, results in the subtenant obtaining the protections afforded to a direct tenant. After three instances, that question has been answered in the affirmative: the District Court found that the arrangement was intended to circumvent the rules governing tenancies, and the Court of Appeal upheld that finding. The resulting legal position for the Ibrahimovic/Seger couple is therefore liability for costs and a weakened position in the parallel proceedings.

Legal assessment

The courts applied the widely discussed Supreme Court nominee-arrangement precedent, on which the tenant relied in his statement of claim.

• The District Court and the Court of Appeal found that the couple had let the property through an intermediary in a nominee arrangement, conferring on the tenant the legal protections of a direct tenant.
• The couple terminated the letting company’s agreement in 2023, which in their view brought the tenants’ agreements to an end; however, the courts held that the tenant remained protected.
• Roland Sjölin, counsel for the Swedish Union of Tenants, considers that the Supreme Court’s decision improves the tenant’s prospects in the parallel proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, where the tenant has been given notice of termination.
• The background is that, when the property was purchased in 2022, the majority of the apartments were let through the letting company, and the lettings continued after the change of ownership.

Consequences

For the tenant: a final right to remain in occupation with the protections of a direct tenant, together with recovery of litigation costs amounting to SEK 422,000.

• For the Ibrahimovic/Seger couple: loss of the opportunity to evict the tenant through the courts and a significant cost liability; their counsel has not commented on the decision.
• For the market: the judgment reinforces the risks associated with nominee arrangements — intermediary structures do not shield an owner from tenants’ claims to direct-tenant status.
• The decisive issue remains before the Rent Tribunal, where the tenant has been given notice of termination and the matter has not yet been determined; the Supreme Court’s decision is considered to strengthen the tenant’s position there.

Under Section 8, the registered party must submit a report to Kammarkollegiet three times per year.

Core issue

For organisations engaged in lobbying directed at the Riksdag and the Government, the decision entails an obligation to register with Kammarkollegiet as of 1 July 2027. The register will, however, be narrower than many advocates of preventive measures had wished: only contacts intended to influence the preparation or determination of a matter are covered. The legal issue is who, under Act (2026:1459) on transparency in communications aimed at influencing political decisions, must register, and which contacts must be reported. The key provisions are Section 4 (registration obligation), Section 5 (exemptions), Sections 8-10 (reporting obligation), and the definitions in Sections 2-3.

Legal assessment

Under Section 2, influence communication means contact with a political decision-maker or their staff for the purpose of influencing the preparation or determination of a matter before the Riksdag or the Government. Assignments to provide advice or support to a person who has, or intends to have, such contact are also covered. Under Section 3, political decision-makers include members of the Riksdag and government ministers; the term staff includes, among others, political secretaries, state secretaries, political advisers, and inquiry secretaries. Under Section 4, legal persons and sole traders that engage in such communication must apply for registration. The exemptions in Section 5 include, among others, sole traders for whom communication is not their principal activity, public authorities, other states, and political parties holding seats and their affiliated organisations. The registration obligation also does not apply to customary contacts within administrative matters or participation in government-appointed working groups and inquiries where the participation is documented. Reporting under Section 9 must include the subject matters, the names of decision-makers or affected units, and the method and extent of contact; clients must be identified. Under Section 10, the absence of influence communication during the period must also be reported. A person who has only provided advice or support to another person is not required to provide information about the contacts. Kammarkollegiet is both the registration body and the supervisory authority.

Consequences

Tobacco lobbyists and other interest organisations targeting the Riksdag and the Government must apply for registration no later than when the Act enters into force on 1 July 2027.

• Companies and organisations will therefore need procedures for documenting contacts with decision-makers, since each reporting period requires information on subject matter and contacts.
• Party employees and others who engage in lobbying without a link to a specific decision, for example issues intended to be included in agreements such as the Tidö Agreement, are not covered by the register.
• Political parties holding seats and their affiliated organisations are entirely exempt, which limits the register’s coverage of precisely the lobbying identified by Annika Hirvonen.
• Anyone who does not engage in influence communication during a period must nevertheless submit a negative report under Section 10.
• Next step: Act (2026:1459) enters into force on 1 July 2027; before then, Kammarkollegiet is expected to prepare the registration procedure.

Under Chapter 6, Section 13, the executive board must be responsible for financial administration and implement the council’s decisions.

Under Chapter 7, Section 3, the director is not eligible for elected office in the municipality, which marks the dividing line between political and administrative responsibility.

Core issue

The post is an opinion piece, not a decision, but the legal issue is who bears responsibility for Osby Municipality’s organisation and finances. The answer under the Local Government Act (2017:725) is clearly allocated: the municipal council decides on the tax rate and organisation, the municipal executive board manages the administration, and the municipal director is the head of the employees. The question that actually needs to be examined is how responsibility is divided between political bodies and officials when cost trends are called into question.

Legal assessment

The rules in the Local Government Act (2017:725) allocate responsibility as follows:

• Under Chapter 3, Section 1, the municipal council decides on the principles for financial benefits, annual accounts, discharge from liability, and organisation; tax matters fall within this area and cannot be delegated under Chapter 3, Section 2.
• Under Chapter 6, Section 1, the executive board must lead and coordinate the administration and supervise the activities of the other committees; under Chapter 6, Section 13, it must be responsible for financial administration and implement the council’s decisions.
• Under Chapter 6, Section 12, the executive board may request opinions and information from committees and employees in order to perform its duties.
• The municipal director is appointed by the executive board under Chapter 7, Section 1, and must hold the leading position among the employees; under Chapter 7, Section 2, the executive board establishes, in instructions, how the director is to lead the administration.
• The number of municipal commissioners is governed by Chapter 4, Section 2: a person who performs an elected office on a full-time basis must have the title of municipal commissioner, but the Act does not prescribe a maximum number; two full-time commissioners are therefore lawful.
• Opposition commissioner is a permitted title under the same Chapter 4, Section 2, but the Act gives the opposition no independent decision-making role. The material contains no case law examining Osby Municipality’s organisation. The municipal examples (Täby, Norrköping) are local governing documents and show that efficiency requirements are typically formulated in operational plans and guidelines on sound financial management, not in legislation. Efficiency is therefore a governance issue under the political responsibility of the municipal council and executive board.

Consequences

Realistically, the post has three possible consequences:

• If the majority (C+S) wants to reduce costs, the municipal council may amend the organisation, the tax rate, or the executive board’s instructions to the municipal director; this requires a decision by the municipal council.
• The executive board may use its right under Chapter 6, Section 12, to request material on staffing trends and impose efficiency requirements in the instructions under Chapter 7, Section 2.
• If residents consider that the administration is being managed poorly, there is no rapid legal remedy; oversight takes place politically through the municipal council, the auditors, and the examination of discharge from liability under Chapter 3, Section 1.
• For Osby’s residents, the issue has practical significance through the tax rate; for officials, the position is that they answer to the executive board, not to the voters.

Under supplementary provision 7.2.1, the Riksdag must, no later than the eighth day after the first meeting of the Chamber during an electoral period, elect the 15 committees in the prescribed order, from the Committee on the Constitution to the Committee on the Labour Market.

The chair of a committee is not elected by the Riksdag in plenary, but by the body itself, and in the event of an equal number of votes the election is decided by drawing lots under Chapter 12, Section 17.

Core issue

The four opposition parties are now awaiting a parliamentary election in which their 176 seats could give them a majority in all 15 committees, while the Tidö parties, with 173 seats, would be in the minority in every preparatory body. What is at stake is not government formation, but control over committee preparation throughout the parliamentary term. The legal question is how committee seats are allocated and how chairmanships are appointed. The rules are found in the Riksdag Act (2014:801): Chapter 7, Section 2 provides that, for each electoral period, the Riksdag shall elect a Committee on the Constitution, a Committee on Finance, a Committee on Taxation, and the other committees, and that the election applies until the end of the electoral period.

Legal assessment

Committee elections are normally prepared by the Committee on Nominations under Chapter 12, Section 2 of the Riksdag Act; a party group that has received at least 4 percent of the votes occupies one seat on the Committee on Nominations under Chapter 12, Section 5, and the remaining ten seats are allocated proportionally.

• In elections by secret ballot, seats are allocated proportionally among groupings appearing under a common designation, pursuant to Chapter 12, Section 12; the comparative figure is calculated by dividing the number of votes by the number of seats allocated plus 1, and, where comparative figures are equal, the election is decided by drawing lots.
• A cartel between S, C, MP, and V is not a legal entity; in order to obtain 9 of 17 seats on a committee, the parties must appear as a common grouping or coordinate their votes in the proportional election.
• The chair of a committee is not elected by the Riksdag in plenary, but by the body itself: under Chapter 13, Section 16, applied to committees through Chapter 12, Section 16, a body whose members are elected wholly or partly by the Riksdag elects from among its members a chair and one or more deputy chairs.
• The election within the body is conducted by acclamation or, if any member so requests, by secret ballot under Chapter 12, Section 17; in the event of an equal number of votes, the election is decided by drawing lots.
• Ballot papers in elections by secret ballot must be simple, sealed, unmarked, and identical in size, material, and colour under supplementary provision 12.8.3; a ballot paper is invalid if it bears a mark that has evidently been added intentionally.
• The material contains no case law on committee cartels; the assessment must therefore be based solely on the textual rules of the Riksdag Act.
• The Speaker election mentioned in the news item follows different rules (Chapter 3 of the Instrument of Government, Chapter 3, Section 4a of the Riksdag Act, according to the references in the sources) and is procedurally separate from committee elections.

Consequences

If the opposition cartel obtains a majority in the proportional allocation by the Committee on Nominations, all 15 committees will have 9 opposition members against 8 from the Tidö parties; the opposition would thereby control committee reports and which matters are prioritised in preparation throughout the parliamentary term.

• The Tidö parties would in practice lose the committee chairmanships, because the chair is elected within each committee, where the opposition has 9 of 17 votes; if a secret ballot is requested, the cartel’s candidate wins, and in a 9-9 tie in an internal election the position is decided by drawing lots.
• For the government and the Tidö parties, this has practical significance for the budget process: the budget bill may be divided among committees under Chapter 7, Section 6, and, with opposition chairs, the preparation of financial matters is directed differently than under Tidö control.
• For voters and the business community, the effect is indirect: proposals introduced by the government may be amended or delayed in committee preparation, since committees prepare government proposals before decisions are taken in the Chamber.
• The cartel’s cohesion is politically conditional; the Centre Party and the Left Party disagree on the question of government, and if one party breaks the cooperation, the majority in individual committees disappears, since 176 seats against 173 gives a margin of only three seats.
• According to Hallengren, how the chairmanships will be distributed among S, C, MP, and V has not yet been negotiated.