Correction. The article makes two flawed assertions. First, that "the current rules make it possible to drag out rent negotiations without any real consequences" and that the negotiation period "should be limited" – this conflicts with Section 15 of the Act on Negotiations Concerning Rent, which already provides that a negotiation meeting must be held within three weeks of service of the request; correctly framed, the debate instead concerns where in the chain after the first negotiation the bottleneck arises, not that time limits are lacking. Second, the article implies that retroactive rent increases are a systemic defect harming tenants, but under the Land Code's provision on higher rent for elapsed time, such retroactive payment liability can only be established by a decision of the Rent and Tenures Tribunal or the court of appeal – the assertion should have been clarified to state that the tenant is entitled to an adjudication before higher rent for elapsed time may be demanded.
Under Section 24 of the Act on Negotiations concerning Rent (1978:304), both the landlord and the tenant have, following a concluded negotiation, the right to apply to the Rent and Housing Tribunal for an adjustment of the rent terms to the extent the negotiation concerned.
Section 31 confers the right to appeal the Tribunal's decision to the Svea Court of Appeal within three weeks, but a decision to appoint or dismiss an arbitrator may not be appealed.
For the parties in Värmland, no further rounds of negotiation await; instead, they face a choice between two dispute-resolution routes: the Rent and Housing Tribunal or an arbitrator. Since the negotiations have concluded without agreement, the collective phase is over, and the question of the rent passes to the determination of the Tribunal or the arbitrator. The basic rule is set out in Section 24 of the Act on Negotiations concerning Rent (1978:304): where negotiations under the negotiation procedure have concluded without agreement, both the landlord and the tenant have the right to apply to the Rent and Housing Tribunal for an adjustment of the rent terms to the extent the negotiation concerned. The same applies where the negotiation was obstructed by circumstances not attributable to the party seeking the adjustment. Also decisive is Section 11 a of the Act (1973:188) on Tenancy Boards and Rent and Housing Tribunals: the Tribunal may not consider the landlord's claim for a higher rent unless negotiations under the negotiation procedure have taken place regarding the matter in dispute. As regards the arbitral route, Section 23 c of the Act on Negotiations concerning Rent applies, which refers to the Act (2022:1657) on Dispute Resolution within the Framework of Certain Collective Rent Negotiations.
A negotiation procedure under Section 5 of the Act on Negotiations concerning Rent (1978:304) entails an obligation on the landlord, on its own initiative, to negotiate a rent increase, where the increase does not concern an optional feature and does not exceed a price recommended by the parties to the negotiation procedure.
For the tenants, the course of events entails a period without a known rent position, and the briefing describes the risk of retroactive increases once the decision is delivered.
The provision requires that moderation be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers, and the second paragraph of the same section prohibits targeting persons under 18 years of age.
By way of comparison, in the case against the credit broker Advea, the Patent and Market Court attached an interim conditional fine totalling SEK 3.5 million to its decision.
Postkodlotteriet now awaits a principal ruling from the Patent and Market Court, in which a single Instagram advertisement could result in an injunction subject to a conditional fine at a level tied to lottery revenues of over SEK 3.5 billion in 2025. The case concerns a film featuring rain of winning cheques, SEK 101 million in gold-coloured text, and a time-limited half-price offer with a final purchase date. The legal question is whether this marketing satisfies the moderation requirement under Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138). The Swedish Consumer Agency's (KO) objection is twofold: the lottery is presented as socially attractive, something everyone ought to participate in, and the offer creates an impression of urgency. According to the authority, the information should be limited to facts about the lottery and presented as factually as possible.
The assessment is made through an overall evaluation of the presentation, content, and design on the chosen medium, in accordance with the Swedish Consumer Agency's general guidelines KOVFS 2025:2 on the marketing of gambling.
Case law is sparse, particularly with respect to social media. In autumn 2022, the Riksdag rejected the bill "A Strengthened Gambling Regulation" on the grounds that case law was in the process of being established and that it was too early to amend the rules. KO seeks an injunction subject to a conditional fine and, for the determination of the amount, refers to Postkodlotteriet's 2025 annual report; no amount has been publicly disclosed.
If the claim is upheld, Svenska Postkodföreningen risks an injunction against the advertisement in question, subject to a conditional fine whose level the court will assess against revenues in the billions.
In such a case, the tenant has the same rights as if the tenancy had been granted directly to him or her.
Its penalty in Section 2 — a fine or imprisonment of at most one year — relates to that track and is not the norm on which the tenancy dispute was based.
The legal position of Ibrahimovic and Seger is now final: the Court of Appeal's judgment stands, as the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The tenant therefore has the same status as a first-hand tenant and cannot be forced to vacate the apartment through the termination procedure the couple attempted to carry out. The essence of the matter is that the parties cannot hide behind a rental company when the company in reality acts on behalf of the owners. The decisive legal question has been whether there is a community of interest between the property owners and the rental company, and whether the arrangement has been exploited to circumvent legislation to the benefit of the tenant. The rule that determines this is Chapter 12, Section 45 a of the Land Code (1970:994), which applies where there is a community of interest between the property owner and the person granting the tenancy and it can be assumed that the legal relationship is being exploited to circumvent provisions to the benefit of the tenant.
The application in the case followed two steps under Chapter 12, Section 45 a:
| Instance | Assessment | Outcome for the tenant |
|---|---|---|
| Stockholm District Court | The legal relationship was exploited to circumvent rent legislation | Same rights as upon direct letting |
| Court of Appeal | Community of interest and circumvention of security of tenure and reasonable rent | District Court's line confirmed |
| Supreme Court | Leave to appeal refused | Court of Appeal's judgment stands |
For Ibrahimovic and Seger: the termination is without effect in the sense that the tenant may remain in the apartment with first-hand tenant rights.
The principal question is whether a subtenant in a straw-man (front) arrangement – where the landlord has a rental company sublet apartments – can invoke the protections of a first-hand tenancy agreement under the Land Code (Jordabalken), and whether this question was of such importance that the Supreme Court should have granted leave to appeal.
Legal basis: Without direct source material in the database, I must rely on a general principle of law: in straw-man arrangements, where the landlord deliberately uses an intermediary to circumvent the obligations under tenancy legislation, case law has developed towards granting the actual tenant the status of a first-hand tenant, since the intermediary has no independent housing need of its own. This is the well-known line of "straw-man" case law from the Supreme Court that was invoked in the statement of claim. At the same time, the cited statutory text (Chapter 12 of the Land Code) shows that ordinary subletting is subject to a stricter rule: rent exceeding what the landlord himself pays, plus a supplement for furniture and other benefits, is "never deemed reasonable". The distinction between these two tracks – a straw-man arrangement with full protection versus ordinary subletting with a rent cap – is the crux of the dispute.
Practical significance: The Supreme Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal means that the Court of Appeal's upholding of the district court's judgment is now precedential in the sense that the straw-man argument has gained further strength in applied case law across two instances, without correction by the Supreme Court. For counsel representing landlords with intermediary arrangements, the central mistake is to assume that a formal sublease agreement automatically limits the tenant's protection to the subletting rules – the courts see through the arrangement when the intermediary has no housing need of its own. The argument that has now been strengthened is to point out that the landlord deliberately chose the structure and must therefore bear the associated risks; invoke the straw-man case law line with the support of the two successful instances. At the same time, a distinction should be drawn between the proceedings: the judgment on security of tenure does not necessarily determine the parallel rent tribunal question concerning termination, even though the counsel quoted in the article considers that the judgment strengthens the tenant's position there – the tribunal proceedings must nonetheless be pursued and determined on their own merits.
Correction: The article presents a simplified picture in two respects. First, it suggests that the subtenant "receives the same rights as a first-hand tenant" generally whenever a straw-man arrangement is used – but under the Land Code's rule on subletting, ordinary subletting is subject to a limitation whereby rent exceeding the landlord's own rent, plus a supplement for furniture and other benefits, is never deemed reasonable; full first-hand protection presupposes precisely a straw-man arrangement in which the intermediary has no need of its own, not subletting in general. Second, it is stated that the losing party "shall" pay the opposing party's legal costs – however, under the main rule of the Code of Judicial Procedure, this applies "unless otherwise provided", i.e. the starting point may be departed from, and the article does not set out the conditions on which liability for costs was established here. Third, it is implied that the tenant was able to remain in the premises by virtue of the district court's judgment even though the tenancy agreement had been terminated, while the Land Code at the same time gives the tenant the option of referring the dispute to the rent tribunal within a specified period – the parallel tribunal proceedings are thus an independent track which the article itself notes but does not explain in legal terms.
Correction. The article formulates the obligation as "lobbyists must report which contacts they have had" and "lobbyists must register with the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency" (Kammarkollegiet), which creates the impression of a universal registration obligation for anyone exercising influence. This is incomplete: under Sections 4–5 of Act (2026:1459), only legal persons and sole traders engaged in influence communication are covered, and Section 5 contains exemptions – including for sole traders whose principal activity is not external communication. Correctly formulated, the article should state that the registration obligation is conditional on the activity constituting influence communication and that certain operators are exempt, rather than implying that every actor who contacts decision-makers must register.
The registration must be submitted to Kammarkollegiet no later than 30 days after the party subject to the registration obligation began carrying on influence communication (Section 6).
If the registered party has not engaged in any influence communication during the period, this too must be stated in the report (Section 10).
The Riksdag has approved new transparency legislation, and the legal situation awaiting lobbyists and their principals is a registration and reporting obligation with the Swedish Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet), entering into force in July 2027. The precise legal question is who must register and report which influence communications, and this is determined by the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communication Aimed at Influencing Political Decisions. Under Section 4 of the Act, the registration obligation attaches to communication intended to influence the preparation or decision-making in a matter. This means the register will be limited: contacts aimed at persuading a party to champion an issue, or issues covered by agreements such as the Tidö Agreement or the January Agreement, are not covered. Annika Hirvonen (MP) criticised precisely this delimitation, but her objections did not prevail.
The supervisory authority is Kammarkollegiet, which both receives registrations and is responsible for supervision. The registered party must thereafter report contacts with political decision-makers and their staff, including which staff members the contacts were made with and the principal manner and approximate extent of the contacts. Where the influence communication was carried out on behalf of another party, the principal must be stated with the same particulars as in the registration (Section 6, second paragraph, items 1 and 2).
The underlying material contains no case law on the question, as the Act has not yet entered into force. By way of comparison, the Act (1996:810) on the Registration of Members of the Riksdag's Commitments and Financial Interests already exists, under which the Riksdag Administration maintains the financial register. Likewise, the Act (2016:1117) on the Registration and Handling of Gifts Received by Members of the Riksdag prescribes a gift register kept by the Riksdag Administration. These registers cover the members' own interests, not lobbyists' contacts, and complement rather than replace the new register.
For tobacco lobbyists and other actors who regularly contact members of the Riksdag and ministers, the Act entails a documentation obligation: the organisations concerned will need, ahead of July 2027, to identify which of their contacts qualify as influence communication. For tobacco prevention organisations such as Tobaksfakta, the register is a tool for making the opposing side's contacts visible, but the limitation to decision-related contacts means that strategic influence outside formal preparatory processes will remain invisible. Kammarkollegiet acquires a new supervisory role, and its application of the exemptions in Section 5 — in particular advocate confidentiality — will be decisive for the register's actual scope.