Correction. The article asserts that the current framework makes it possible to prolong rent negotiations without any real consequences. That is incomplete: the material shows that Section 58 b of the Land Code gives the tenant a right to compensation where the landlord, during the utility-value period, demands a higher rent than that proposed in mediation and renewal consequently does not occur, and that failure to comply with the obligation under the Rent Negotiation Act to refer a dispute to the Rent Tribunal results in loss of the right to bring proceedings. Existing law therefore contains both coercive mechanisms and damages-based sanctions, even if the article’s central point, that no sanctions attach to the negotiation delay itself, may be partly justified. The article also suggests that retroactive rents are a systemic defect, but Section 6 of the Private Letting Act (2026:772) shows that retroactivity is a deliberately designed default rule: the new rent is to apply from the date of the application to the Rent Tribunal, unless the Tribunal decides that it is to apply from another date. Retroactivity is therefore a regulated statutory solution, with a discretionary adjustment mechanism for the Rent Tribunal, not an erratic feature of the framework; the article should have stated that starting point and referred to the Tribunal’s ability to select another date, rather than portraying retroactive increases as wholly uncontrolled.
Under section 11 a of the Act (1973:188) on Regional Tenancy Tribunals and Rent Tribunals, the tribunal may not, in a rent dispute, examine the landlord’s claim for higher rent unless negotiations under the negotiation procedure have taken place regarding the disputed issue.
Decisions of the Rent Tribunal under the Act are appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal within three weeks of notification under section 31.
When rent negotiations in Värmland reach an impasse, the parties do not await a court, but rather the Rent Tribunal or an arbitrator – and pending a decision, the previous rent applies, with the risk that a late increase will be enforced retroactively. This is the very structure of the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304) that makes protracted negotiations possible: according to the opinion piece, the Act contains no time limit compelling the parties to reach a timely outcome. The precise legal issue is which route to dispute resolution becomes available when negotiations under a negotiation procedure have ended without agreement, and which time limits then apply. The answer is governed by section 24 of the Rent Negotiation Act, which gives both the landlord and the tenant the right to apply to the Rent Tribunal for amendment of the lease terms in the part covered by the negotiation, and by section 23 c, which refers the arbitration procedure to the Act (2022:1657) on dispute resolution within the framework of certain collective rent negotiations.
The negotiation procedure under section 5 of the Rent Negotiation Act entails an obligation for the landlord, on its own initiative, to negotiate a rent increase, unless the increase concerns an optional addition and does not exceed what the parties have recommended.
For tenants: continued uncertainty as to which rent applies during the negotiation period, with a risk of a retroactive increase once the tribunal or arbitrator finally decides.
Svenska Postkodföreningen faces civil prohibition proceedings before the Patent and Market Court, where the practically decisive issue will be whether the prohibition is coupled with a conditional fine and, if so, at what level. KO’s application concerns a single Instagram advertisement, but seeks to establish precedent on what the moderation requirement means in social media. The precise legal issue is whether the advertisement - prize cheques raining down over a residential neighbourhood, SEK 101 million in gold-coloured text, and a time-limited half-price offer - complies with Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138). The provision requires moderation in the marketing of gambling to consumers and prohibits targeting persons under 18. The assessment is made under the Swedish Consumer Agency’s general guidelines KOVFS 2025:2, through an overall assessment of the presentation, content and design in the chosen medium.
KO’s two objections correspond to two parts of the guidance in KOVFS 2025:2:
If KO succeeds, Postkodlotteriet risks a prohibition on this type of Instagram marketing, coupled with a conditional fine whose level the court may calibrate against the company’s billion-krona revenues.
Correction. The news report states the consequence of the rule, namely that the tenant has the same rights against the property owners as in the case of a direct grant, but omits the necessary precondition: that there must be a community of interest between the property owner and the grantor, as appears from the quoted statutory text in the Land Code. It is precisely the combination of community of interest and an intention to circumvent the rules that justifies piercing the arrangement; without the community of interest, a termination by an independent letting company would not automatically affect the property owner’s position. A more precise formulation would therefore be that the tenant obtains the same rights against the property owner where there is both a community of interest between the owner and the intermediary and the legal relationship may be presumed to have been used to circumvent the tenant’s statutory protections.
The tenant is the ultimate prevailing party: the Supreme Court has refused leave to appeal, meaning that the Court of Appeal’s judgment has now become final. In practical terms, this means that Ibrahimovic/Seger cannot proceed with their termination notice; the tenant may remain in occupation with the same rights as a direct tenant. The legal issue concerned whether an intermediate party in the chain of leases may be disregarded where the arrangement has been used as a nominee structure. The relevant rules are found in Chapter 12 of the Land Code, concerning security of tenure and reasonable rent, and in the Act (1985:277) on Certain Nominee Relationships, which addresses situations where a formal contracting party conceals the true counterparty.
Both lower courts applied the same approach:
The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant leave to appeal does not constitute a determination of the merits; the Court of Appeal’s operative judgment therefore stands undisturbed as the final outcome of the case.
The tenant may remain in the apartment with the rights of a direct tenant, including security of tenure and the right to reasonable rent under Chapter 12 of the Land Code.
Does a subtenant in a nominee arrangement, where the property owner has let the apartment through a rental company in order to circumvent tenancy law, have the right to remain in the apartment with the same protection as a direct tenant when the intermediary’s agreement is terminated, and is that issue of such significance that the Supreme Court should grant leave to appeal?
As no direct statutory material has been provided, I rely here on the general legal principle developed in the Supreme Court’s so-called nominee case law: where a landlord systematically lets apartments through an intermediary (nominee) in order to circumvent the protective rules of tenancy law, the tenancy relationship may in practice be regarded as existing between the property owner and the actual tenant, who is thereby afforded the strong security of tenure enjoyed by a direct tenant under the tenancy provisions of the Land Code. In this dispute, both the District Court and the Court of Appeal applied that principle to Zlatan Ibrahimovic’s and Helena Seger’s arrangement in Östermalm, under which the rental company let the apartments and the couple terminated the intermediary in 2023, thereby also terminating all tenants. The Supreme Court’s decision not to grant leave to appeal does not amount to a substantive determination of the issue, but means that the Court of Appeal’s application of the principle now stands and will carry guiding force in similar cases.
The practice here is consistent at two levels: first, the District Court and the Court of Appeal both found that the nominee arrangement gave the tenant the rights of a direct tenant; second, the Supreme Court chose not to grant leave to appeal, signalling that the Court of Appeal’s application of the much-discussed nominee ruling was not considered to require clarification. It is important, however, to distinguish between legal effect and precedential value: a refusal of leave to appeal is not a Supreme Court judgment of principle, even if, in practice, it strengthens confidence in the Court of Appeal’s approach.
The strongest argument now gaining force is that a tenant in an intermediary arrangement can invoke the nominee case law already at first instance with good prospects, since two instances have now confirmed that the arrangement does not protect the property owner, and the opposing party has also been ordered to pay legal costs of SEK 422,000, raising the stakes for landlords considering similar arrangements. In concrete terms, counsel for tenants in parallel proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, as here where the tenant has been given notice, should rely on the final judgment as support for the tenant having the same protection as a direct tenant, which, according to the tenant’s counsel, improves the prospects before the tribunal. The risk lies with property owners who inherit or acquire properties with existing nominee arrangements: terminating the intermediary does not extinguish the tenants’ security of tenure, and continuing the dispute after two lost instances entails both cost and litigation risk, as the Supreme Court’s refusal of leave to appeal now illustrates.
Correction. The article states that “lobbyists must register with the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency”, which is incomplete: the registration obligation under Sections 6-7 of Act (2026:1459) applies only to those who meet the Act’s definition of a person subject to notification and who engage in influence communication within the meaning of the Act, not to everyone colloquially referred to as a lobbyist. The article also failed to mention that the Agency’s role under Section 14 is to register notifications and supervise the activity, and that a person who has only provided advice or support to another need not provide certain information. More precisely, it should have been formulated as follows: a defined category of persons subject to notification must notify the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency, which maintains the register and exercises supervision, while contacts outside the formal decision-making and preparatory process, such as party-political agreements like the Tidö Agreement, are not covered.
The report must be submitted to Kammarkollegiet no later than 1 June for the period January-April, no later than 1 October for the period May-August, and no later than 1 February for the period September-December.
Influence communication within the meaning of the Act means that a natural or legal person has contact with a political decision-maker or a staff member of a political decision-maker for the purpose of influencing the preparation of, or decision in, a matter before the Riksdag or the Government, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome.
Lobbyists and their clients will be subject to registration and reporting obligations with Kammarkollegiet, as the Riksdag has adopted Act (2026:1459) on transparency in communications intended to influence political decisions. The Act enters into force on 1 July 2027. The central legal issue is who falls within the registration and reporting obligations, which is determined by the definitions of influence communication and political decision-maker in Sections 2-3 of the Act. If an actor falls within the definition, the obligations in Sections 8-10 apply; if not, there is no obligation at all.
Under Section 2, influence communication means contact with a political decision-maker or that decision-maker’s staff member for the purpose of influencing the preparation or decision in a matter before the Riksdag or the Government, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome. Assignment-based advice or support to a person who has, or intends to have, such contact is also covered. Under Section 3, political decision-maker means a member of the Riksdag and a government minister; staff members include, among others, political secretaries, employees of the Riksdag Administration, state secretaries, political advisers, and investigators and committee members appointed by the Government. The obligations of the registered party are:
Certain exceptions apply according to the source material: the notification obligation does not apply to contacts with intergovernmental organisations, political parties holding mandates or their affiliated organisations, customary contacts in administrative matters, or participation in government-appointed working groups or inquiries where the participation is documented and publicly available. A registered party that has only provided advice or support to another person need not provide information on contacts and means of contact. The material contains no case law on the Act, which has not yet entered into force.
For tobacco lobbyists and other trade organisations, the Act means that contacts with members of the Riksdag, government ministers, and their staff in a specific matter will be publicly reported, with decision-makers identified by name.