Correction. The assertion that the current framework makes it possible to prolong negotiations "without any real consequences" is incomplete: the framework contains concrete consequences for default – referral to the Tribunal must be made in time, failing which the right of action is forfeited, and decisions of the Tribunal are appealable within a three-week period pursuant to Sections 30–31 of the Rent Negotiation Act. Furthermore, the claim regarding retroactive rent increases is incomplete: retroactive increases are indeed lawful under Section 55 e of the Land Code (fifth to eighth paragraphs), but the source material does not show that this is linked to late negotiation decisions as such – presenting retroactivity as a systemic flaw without mentioning that the legislature expressly regulates, and thereby accepts, retroactive rents is misleading. More precisely, the article should state that the rules permit retroactivity but that the time frames of the negotiation process itself are not subject to sanctions.
Under Section 24, the landlord and the tenant have the right to apply to the Rent Tribunal for an amendment of the rent terms once negotiations have concluded without agreement.
The Rent Tribunal's review is blocked if no negotiation has taken place under Section 11 a – parties that skip the negotiation stage lose their ability to act before the Tribunal.
When collective rent negotiations reach an impasse, the next step is generally to refer the dispute to the Rent Tribunal or an arbitrator – not for the tenant to be relieved of the increase. Retroactive rent increases are legally possible, since decisions may be given effect from a point in time prior to the ruling. Negotiations therefore have concrete financial consequences for tenants. The governing statute is the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304). Under Section 23 c, the Act (2022:1657) on dispute resolution within the framework of certain collective rent negotiations applies to the arbitrator's proceedings. A significant procedural barrier is found in Section 11 a of the Act (1973:188) concerning Agricultural Tenancy Boards and Rent Tribunals: the Rent Tribunal may not consider the landlord's claim for higher rent unless negotiations under the negotiation procedure have taken place concerning the disputed matter. The negotiation stage is thus a mandatory preliminary step before adjudication.
The parties' rights and the course of proceedings may be summarised as follows:
Tenants in municipalities with protracted negotiations must be prepared for retroactive rent increases once the decision is issued; personal financial planning is impeded in the meantime.
Correction. The article claims that "the Gambling Act requires that information be limited to facts about the lottery and presented as factually as possible". This is a simplification not found in Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act, which merely provides that moderation shall be observed and that marketing must not be directed specifically at persons under 18 years of age. The requirement of factual and balanced presentation derives from the Consumer Agency's general guidelines (KOVFS 2025:2, Section 2.2.2.1), which are not binding law, and partly from SIFS 2018:4 on information requirements, which inter alia covers information about the risks of gambling for money and contact details for an independent helpline for gambling problems. A correct formulation would be that the Gambling Act contains an open-ended moderation requirement whose concrete content has been partly specified in general guidelines and regulations, but that the demarcation – particularly for social media – has not yet been established in case law, which is precisely what this case is intended to clarify.
Postkodlotteriet is facing a marketing injunction subject to a conditional fine before the Patent and Market Court, having been sued by the Consumer Ombudsman. The dispute concerns a single advertisement on Instagram, but the Consumer Ombudsman's objective is to obtain a precedent-setting interpretation of the moderation requirement. The current legal position means that the lottery risks an injunction against continued use of the advertisement, combined with a conditional fine scaled according to turnover. The precise legal question is whether the advertisement violates Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gaming Act (2018:1138), which requires moderation in the marketing of games to consumers. Under the Swedish Consumer Agency's general guidelines (KOVFS 2025:2), the provision entails an overall assessment of the presentation, content and design in the chosen medium. The guidelines specify that marketing must not be intrusive, must not create the impression of greater chances of winning, and must not encourage ill-considered decisions.
The Consumer Ombudsman's objection concerns two elements of the advertisement: that the lottery is portrayed as socially attractive, and that a time-limited half-price offer creates a sense of urgency. The guidelines in KOVFS 2025:2 state that marketing should not convey that gambling solves social problems, and that urging messages capable of leading to ill-considered decisions are incompatible with the requirement.
A ruling would have an impact far beyond Postkodlotteriet, since case law on social media is thin and the Consumer Agency's guidelines are merely guidance. For licence holders in the gaming sector, the practical consequence is that short, visual and algorithmically distributed formats are tested against the same requirements as traditional advertising.
Correction. The article states only the second condition — that the legal arrangement was used to circumvent the protective provisions of the tenancy legislation — and fails to mention that the rule under Chapter 12 of the Land Code also requires a community of interest between the property owner and the lessor vis-à-vis the tenant. It is precisely that condition which the Court of Appeal expressly examined and found to be satisfied. Correctly formulated, the article should state that the tenant acquires the same rights as a direct tenant only when BOTH a community of interest exists AND the arrangement may with reason be assumed to have been used to circumvent the security-of-tenure and rent regulations; the article presents the circumvention as an independent and sufficient condition.
In such a situation, the tenant has the same right vis-à-vis Zlatan and Helena Seger as if they had let the tenancy directly to him.
The Court of Appeal shared this assessment and further found a community of interest between the couple and the rental company vis-à-vis the tenant.
The legal position of Ibrahimović and Seger is now final: the Court of Appeal's judgment stands, as the Supreme Court has refused leave to appeal. This means that the tenant may remain in the apartment with the same rights as a first-hand tenant, including security of tenure and the right to a reasonable rent. The couple can no longer remove the tenant from the apartment by means of the notice of termination that gave rise to the dispute. The legal issue was whether an arrangement via a rental company could be used to circumvent the tenant's protections. Decisive is Chapter 12 of the Land Code (jordabalken), in particular the provisions on security of tenure and reasonable rent, as well as the principle that a tenant cannot be placed in a worse position through an intermediary. The District Court and the Court of Appeal applied the line described in the source material as established Supreme Court practice: where the legal relationship is exploited to circumvent tenancy legislation to the tenant's benefit, the tenant is treated as equivalent to a direct tenant of the property owner.
The source material shows how the courts reasoned step by step:
The sources also show the systematic context: the Act (2012:978) on the Letting of One's Own Dwelling limits the tenant's right to extension in lettings outside business activity, and Section 2 of that same Act renders terms operating to the tenant's detriment of no effect. It is precisely this type of protection that an intermediary arrangement can neutralise, which the courts found to have occurred here.
The tenant remains in the apartment with the rights of a first-hand tenant; the notice of termination from Ibrahimović and Seger is of no effect.
The question is whether a subtenant in a straw-man arrangement, where the property owner lets premises through a rental company, should be granted the same strong security of tenure as a direct (first-hand) tenant, and whether the Supreme Court would examine this application of the Tenancy Act. [TEISINIS_PAGRUNDAS]: Since no direct rule has been provided, I rely on a general principle of law: under the provisions of the Land Code on exceptions to a tenant's security of tenure, that protection may be excluded only where there is a community of interest between the property owner and the grantor, and where, in view of this and other circumstances, it can be assumed that the legal relationship is being exploited in order to circumvent statutory provisions. In this case, the District Court and the Court of Appeal found that the couple had let the premises through an intermediary in a straw-man arrangement, which means the tenant is equated with a first-hand tenant. The Supreme Court's refusal of leave to appeal means that this interpretation now stands as a final judgment.
What case law says: The chain of courts is uniform in this matter: the Stockholm District Court ruled in favour of the tenant, the Svea Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, and the Supreme Court found no reason to grant leave to appeal, indicating that the Supreme Court perceives no legally uncertain issue warranting review in applying the straw-man doctrine to this type of arrangement. This reinforces established practice whereby intermediary arrangements involving a community of interest do not override a tenant's security of tenure.
Correction: The article implies that landlords "may not" circumvent the Tenancy Act through straw-man arrangements, but this is incomplete: under the Land Code provision, two cumulative conditions must be met — first, a community of interest between the property owner and the grantor, and second, that the legal relationship can be assumed, in view of that community of interest, to be exploited in order to circumvent statutory provisions. It is thus not the intermediary itself that renders the arrangement unlawful, but the combination of a community of interest and intent to circumvent the law; an impartial rental company with no community of interest with the property owner could, in principle, be lawful. The article should have clarified that the courts found precisely these conditions satisfied in the specific case, not that straw-man arrangements are prohibited as such.
Practical significance: The Supreme Court's refusal of leave to appeal makes the argument that tenants in intermediary arrangements acquire first-hand status considerably stronger — in the parallel tenancy tribunal dispute over the notice of termination, which is still ongoing, the tenant can now invoke a final judgment establishing that he enjoys the same protection as a first-hand tenant, which in practice should nullify a termination based on the weaker protection of subtenants. For property owners, the lesson is that arrangements involving a rental company with a community of interest with the owner carry the risk that tenants will be equated with first-hand tenants, with full security of tenure and — in this case — liability for legal costs of SEK 422,000; anyone wishing to use an intermediary should ensure genuine independence and document that the arrangement is not intended to circumvent the protective provisions of the Tenancy Act.
The registered person shall submit a report on their influence communication to Kammarkollegiet no later than 1 June for the period January–April, no later than 1 October for the period May–August, and no later than 1 February for the period September–December.
From 1 July 2027, affected organisations will face a registration obligation with the Swedish Companies Registration Office (Kammarkollegiet) for contacts with the Riksdag and the Government. This follows the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communication Aimed at Influencing Political Decisions, adopted by the Riksdag and entering into force on 1 July 2027. The decisive legal question will be whether a given contact constitutes "influence communication" within the meaning of Section 2: contact with a political decision-maker or that person's staff with the aim of influencing the preparation or decision in a matter, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome. The Act does not cover all contacts, which was the core of the criticism raised by Annika Hirvonen of the Green Party during the preparatory work.
Those subject to the registration obligation are natural and legal persons conducting influence communication; the activities of a legal person or sole trader are covered where the natural person is a representative, employee or contractor and acts in that capacity (Section 2, second and third paragraphs).
The tobacco industry and other interest organisations that currently lobby without transparency must, from July 2027, document and report their contacts with members of the Riksdag, cabinet ministers and their staff at three-month intervals.