Legal prism — 2026-10-13

Correction. The article claims that the current framework makes it possible to prolong rent negotiations without any real consequences. That is incomplete: the materials show that Chapter 12, Section 11 of the Land Code directly restricts the landlord’s ability to require less favourable terms or refuse an extension before mediation has concluded, and that Sections 13-14 of the Rent Negotiation Act contain sanctions for breaches of the procedural steps on which the negotiation order is based. In addition, review by the Rent Tribunal under Section 30 of the Rent Negotiation Act is an available dispute-resolution mechanism without the parties needing a separate agreement in cases where the Act permits referral. The article should therefore be framed so that the criticism is that the existing sanctions and time limits do not operate sufficiently effectively in practice, not that the legislation contains no consequences at all.

Where negotiations have concluded without agreement, Section 24 of the same Act entitles both the landlord and the tenant to apply to the Rent Tribunal for an amendment of the rent terms to the extent the negotiations concerned.

A decision of the Rent Tribunal under Section 31 of the Rent Negotiation Act may be appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal within three weeks of the date of notification.

Core issue

Tenants in Värmland are facing the prospect of this year's rent being determined retroactively, as negotiations between property owners and the tenants' organisation have deadlocked. The legal situation awaiting the parties is not negotiation but dispute resolution: once negotiations have concluded without agreement, either the landlord or the tenant may apply to the Rent Tribunal for an amendment of the rent terms under Section 24 of the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304). The precise legal question is therefore what rent shall apply – and from what date – when the parties fail to reach agreement within the collective negotiation framework. The rules governing this question are found in the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304), Chapter 12 of the Land Code, and the Act (1973:188) concerning Agricultural Tenancy Boards and Rent Tribunals.

Legal assessment

A negotiation arrangement entails, under Section 5 of the Rent Negotiation Act, an obligation on the landlord to initiate negotiations on rent increases on its own initiative, provided the increase does not relate to an optional addition and does not exceed a price recommended by the parties to the negotiation arrangement.

• The Rent Tribunal examines the matter under Section 30 of the Rent Negotiation Act in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act (1973:188) concerning Agricultural Tenancy Boards and Rent Tribunals; the tribunal may summon the parties to a hearing and impose a conditional fine where personal appearance is required.
• Under Section 11 a of the Act (1973:188), in a rent dispute under Chapter 12 of the Land Code, the tribunal may not consider the landlord's claim for a higher rent if no negotiation under the negotiation arrangement has taken place regarding the matter in dispute – negotiation is thus a procedural prerequisite.
• Instead, the parties may have the matter determined by an arbitrator; in proceedings before the arbitrator, Section 23 c of the Rent Negotiation Act applies the Act (2022:1657) on dispute resolution within the framework of certain collective rent negotiations.
• Under Section 30, a property owners' association or tenants' association is not a party in a matter under Section 22; however, damages under Section 8, second paragraph, are determined by the general courts.
• The source material contains no case law, and accordingly no court decisions can be cited.

Consequences

For tenants: continued uncertainty as to what rent applies, with a risk of retroactive increases once the tribunal or arbitrator rules – the decision may not come until well into the year.

• For property owners: unclear revenues for much of the year while operating and maintenance costs continue to accrue, which, according to the opinion piece, complicates the planning of maintenance and new housing construction.
• For the market: the same pattern is repeating itself across the country, which the piece argues demonstrates that the legislation on dispute resolution in collective rent negotiations needs reform, not merely the negotiation technique.
• The piece's demands for reform: a statutory right for landlords to refer disputes to an arbitrator without separate agreements, a limited negotiation period, simplified proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, and decisions based on objective economic criteria.

According to KO, the provision means that the information must be limited to facts about the lottery and presented as objectively as possible.

In the case against the credit broker Advea, an interim conditional fine totalling SEK 3.5 million was attached to the decision.

Core issue

Svenska Postkodföreningen is now awaiting a procedural position before the Patent and Market Court, in which the Consumer Agency (KO) seeks an injunction against a single Instagram advertisement, combined with a conditional fine (vite) — with the amount tied to lottery revenues of just over SEK 3.5 billion for 2025. What is at stake is not merely the advertisement at issue, but a precedent concerning what the moderation requirement of the Gambling Act means for gambling advertising on social media. The precise legal question is whether the advertisement violates Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138), which requires that moderation be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers.

• KO's objection concerns two elements: the portrayal of the lottery as socially attractive and a time-limited half-price offer creating a sense of urgency.
• The assessment must be made as an overall assessment of the presentation, content, and design on the medium, in accordance with KOVFS 2025:2, Section 2.1.
• In the autumn of 2022, the Riksdag rejected the proposal for an adjusted moderation requirement, on the grounds that case law was in the process of becoming established.

Legal assessment

KO seeks an injunction combined with a conditional fine and cites the Swedish Postcode Lottery's 2025 annual report as the basis for a relatively high fine.

• KOVFS 2025:2, Section 2.2.1: the marketing of gambling must not be intrusive or liable to attract particular attention.
• The same guidance, Section 2.2.1.1: the marketing must not give the impression that the chances of winning are greater than they are, for example the impression that it is easy to win large sums.
• Section 2.2.2: encouraging messages that may prompt an ill-considered decision to gamble should not occur.
• Section 2.2.1.2: technical designs that the consumer cannot reasonably avoid — for example flashing or pulsating elements — are considered intrusive. Gold-coloured text about SEK 101 million, falling winning cheques, and a final purchase date may be weighed against these points in the overall assessment. The Consumer Agency's general guidance is not binding, but a ruling by the Patent and Market Court would carry more weight than the guidance. The Swedish Postcode Lottery must now respond to KO's objections before the Court.

Consequences

If the claim is upheld, an injunction against the advertisement is expected, in practice combined with a conditional fine as sought by KO; the level of the fine will be set by the Court, with lottery revenues of just over SEK 3.5 billion as the benchmark.

• A ruling would serve as guiding precedent for the marketing of the entire gambling market on social media, where case law has so far been sparse.
• Licensed operators in the gambling market would thereby receive concrete guidance on how short, visual, and algorithmically distributed formats are assessed against the moderation requirement.
• If the Court instead dismisses the claim, only the Consumer Agency's general guidance would remain as support, and the gap left by the rejected legislative proposal would persist.

Correction. The news report reflects the district court’s conclusion that the tenant has the same rights against Ibrahimovic and Seger as if they had granted the tenancy directly, but omits that this effect under Chapter 7, Section 31 of the Land Code requires two cumulative conditions: a community of interest between the property owner and the grantor, and use of the legal relationship to circumvent the favourable provisions of tenancy legislation. The mere existence of an intermediary in the chain is therefore not enough; it is the combination of common interests and an avoidance purpose that gives the tenant directly effective rights against the property owner. The court of appeal expressly found both elements, and a correct formulation should state that the protection applies specifically to such nominee-like arrangements, not to every subletting or intermediary tenancy.

The Court of Appeal shared the assessment that there is a community of interest between Zlatan Ibrahimović and Helena Seger on the one hand and the rental company on the other hand in relation to the tenant.

Under Section 2 of the Act (2012:978) on the Rental of One's Own Dwelling, contractual terms that are to the detriment of the tenant are without effect.

Core issue

The legal position of Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Helena Seger is now final: the Court of Appeal's judgment stands, and the tenant may remain in occupation with the same security of tenure and rental rights as a first-hand tenant. The Supreme Court's decision to refuse leave to appeal means that the couple can no longer have the termination of the lease enforced through judicial review. The legal core of the case is a straw-man (front company) arrangement: the tenant has rented from a rental company which the courts have found to be in a community of interest with the property owners. According to the assessment of the District Court and the Court of Appeal, the legal relationship has been exploited in order to circumvent provisions of the tenancy legislation that are favourable to the tenant. The rules that determine the issue are Chapter 12 of the Land Code (Jordabalken) on security of tenure and reasonable rent, as well as the Act (1985:277) on Certain Straw-Man Arrangements. The courts applied the principle that where a tenancy is used to circumvent favourable provisions, the tenant is treated as if the lease had been granted directly by the real owner.

Legal assessment

The District Court found that the tenant has the same rights vis-à-vis Ibrahimovic and Seger as if they had granted the lease directly to him.

• The Court of Appeal shared the assessment of a community of interest between the couple and the rental company, and that the legal relationship circumvented the legislation on security of tenure and reasonable rent.
• The tenant has argued that he paid an excessive rent and referred to Supreme Court case law on straw-man arrangements.
• The tenant may further have the right to have the rental terms examined by the Rent and Tenures Tribunal.

Consequences

Ibrahimovic and Seger cannot terminate the tenancy with the effect they intended; the tenant remains with the security of tenure of a first-hand tenant.

• If an excessive rent is proven, the tenant may have a claim for repayment of the amount exceeding a reasonable rent.
• For other property owners who let through companies, the signal is that a community of interest with the owner may render the company's terminations ineffective.
• For tenants in comparable arrangements, the judgment opens the way to demand first-hand tenant status and a rent reduction.

The reporting deadlines under Section 8 are: no later than 1 June for January–April, no later than 1 October for May–August, and no later than 1 February for September–December.

The Act enters into force on 1 July 2027; the first reporting periods and the practical design of supervision are not evident from the material.

Core issue

Lobbyists and their clients face a registration and reporting obligation with the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet) from 1 July 2027, under the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communications Aimed at Influencing Political Decisions. The register is limited in scope: it covers only contacts aimed at influencing the preparation or decision-making of a matter before the Riksdag or the Government. The central legal question is which communications constitute influence communications within the meaning of Section 2 and thereby trigger the notification and reporting obligations. Section 2 defines influence communications as contact with a political decision-maker or the decision-maker's staff in order to promote a particular interest or outcome, as well as providing, on commission, advice or support to someone engaged in such contact. Section 3 delimits who counts as political decision-makers: members of the Riksdag and government ministers, as well as certain staff members such as political secretaries, state secretaries, political advisers and inquiry secretaries.

Legal assessment

Anyone conducting influence communications in the capacity of a legal person or sole trader (as a representative or employee, Section 2, second paragraph) must apply for registration and thereafter report to Kammarkollegiet, which is the supervisory authority.

• The reporting under Section 9 must include the subjects of the communications and, for each subject, the names of the decision-makers or information on the ministry, unit or committee concerned, as well as the principal means of contact and the approximate extent of the contact.
• Where the assignment has been carried out for another party, this must be stated, with information about the client; those who have only provided advice or support are exempt from these particulars.
• If no influence communications have been conducted during the period, this too must be reported (Section 10).
• Certain contacts are not covered: ordinary dealings with public authorities, participation in government-appointed working groups or inquiries where the documentation is public, contacts with intergovernmental organisations or ordinary diplomatic relations, and political parties holding a mandate and their affiliated organisations. The underlying material shows that criticism from the Green Party's Annika Hirvonen calling for a more comprehensive register did not gain traction; contacts concerning parties' internal agreements, for example in arrangements resembling the Tidö Agreement or the January Agreement, are not covered because they precede the formal preparatory process. No case law is found in the material. The register complements the existing financial register under Act (1996:810), under which members of the Riksdag report assignments and financial interests in writing to the Riksdag Administration within four weeks.

Consequences

For tobacco lobbyists and other interest organisations, the Act means that every contact intended to influence a specific matter before the Riksdag or the Government will be publicly reported, with the names of decision-makers and the subjects concerned.

• For companies and consultants who lobby authorities on commission, clients and information about them will be visible in the reporting.
• For members of the Riksdag, government ministers and their staff, the register means that their contacts with registered lobbyists can be publicly traced, while parties' internal agreements and publicly documented inquiry work remain outside its scope.
• For Kammarkollegiet, a new role arises as the registration and supervisory authority.
• The next step is for affected actors to apply for registration with Kammarkollegiet in connection with the Act's entry into force.