Under Section 24 of the Rent Negotiations Act, the landlord and the tenant are entitled to apply to the rent tribunal for an amendment of the rent terms where a negotiation under the negotiation procedure has concluded without agreement.
The rent tribunal's decisions in rent negotiation matters are appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal within three weeks of the date of notification (Section 31 of the Rent Negotiations Act).
Tenants in Värmland face a legal situation in which the annual rent remains undetermined until the negotiation either results in an agreement or the matter is referred to the rent tribunal or an arbitrator. In practical terms, this means that an increase decided late can be implemented retroactively, since nothing in the regulatory framework sets a time limit for when the agreement must be concluded. The core of the news item is that Fastighetsägarna Värmland (the Värmland Property Owners' Association) seeks to change precisely this: a statutory right to refer a dispute to an arbitrator without a special agreement, and a limited negotiation period. The precise legal question is which avenues of dispute resolution remain open when a negotiation under a negotiation procedure reaches deadlock, and which deadlines and bodies then determine the rent. The rules are found in the Act on Rent Negotiations (1978:304) and the Act (1973:188) on Tenancy Boards and Rent Tribunals. Under Section 23 c, the Act (2022:1657) on Dispute Resolution within the Framework of Certain Collective Rent Negotiations applies to the arbitrator's handling of the matter.
A negotiation procedure entails, under Section 5 of the Rent Negotiations Act, an obligation on the landlord to negotiate a rent increase on its own initiative, provided the increase does not relate to an optional addition and does not exceed a price recommended by the parties to the negotiation procedure.
For tenants: continued uncertainty as to which rent applies during the year and the risk of a retroactive increase when notice is given, which complicates personal financial planning.
If the claim succeeds, the court may prohibit the video and attach a conditional fine to the injunction; the level of the fine may be calibrated by reference to lottery revenues of just over SEK 3.5 billion per year.
The court previously imposed an interim fine totalling SEK 3.5 million in the case against the credit intermediary Advea.
Svenska Postkodföreningen is awaiting a main hearing before the Patent and Market Court, in which an injunction against a single Instagram advertising video may be combined with a conditional fine (vite) to be calculated against the company's annual turnover. This is a marketing law proceeding, not a gambling licensing matter; the Swedish Gambling Authority is not a party, and the licence of the Postkodlotteriet lottery is not being challenged in the case. The precise legal question is whether the video violates Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138), which requires that moderation be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers, and whether the injunction should be combined with a conditional fine under the sanction system of the Marketing Act. The sources of law are the statute itself and the Swedish Consumer Agency's general guidelines KOVFS 2025:2 on the marketing of gambling, which provide guidance but do not bind the court.
KO's assessment rests on a holistic evaluation of the video's content and design:
KOVFS 2025:2 provides concrete starting points for the assessment:
The Consumer Agency's guidelines are general recommendations without binding force; the court will weigh them as one source of law among others. In autumn 2022, the Riksdag rejected the government's proposal for an adjusted moderation requirement in the bill "A Strengthened Gambling Regulation", partly on the grounds that case law was in the process of becoming established. Case law remains sparse, particularly with respect to social media; a ruling by the Patent and Market Court would therefore carry greater weight than the Consumer Agency's guidelines. Postkodlotteriet must now respond to KO's objections before the court, and KO has not published any specified amount for the conditional fine.
The Court of Appeal found a community of interest between Ibrahimović and Seger on the one hand and the letting company on the other in relation to the tenant.
The District Court found that the tenant has the same right vis-à-vis Ibrahimović and Seger as if they had let the tenancy directly to him.
The legal position of Ibrahimović and Seger is now final: the Supreme Court (HD) refused leave to appeal, wherefore the Court of Appeal's judgment stands as the final determination in the tenancy dispute. This means that the tenant may remain in occupation with the same status as a first-hand tenant, even though the couple terminated the contract via a letting company. The precise legal question was whether a community of interest between the property owner and the letting company entails that the legal relationship is deemed to have been exploited in order to circumvent security of tenure and reasonable rent to the benefit of the tenant. Decisive are the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Land Code (Jordabalken) on security of tenure, as well as the rules on waiver of security of tenure in Chapter 12, Sections 45 a and 56 of the Land Code, which pursuant to Ordinance (2005:1148) require special forms in order to be effective. Such a waiver is without effect where the letting has been made through a front (bulvan) for the purpose of circumventing tenancy legislation.
The court wrote that "it may be assumed that the legal relationship has been exploited in order to circumvent provisions of tenancy legislation that are to the benefit of N.N." The couple appealed to the Court of Appeal, which shared this assessment. The tenant had relied on Supreme Court precedent and argued that he had paid an excessive rent under a front arrangement benefiting the property owner. Under Act (1985:277) on Certain Front Arrangements, cases concerning front arrangements are heard in the district court where the front is to answer in a dispute over ownership, which shows that front-arrangement assessments are examined as civil disputes. The rule in Chapter 12, Section 46 a of the Land Code on a new tenancy agreement is one of the benefits that the tenant thereby retains, which Act (2012:978) on the Letting of One's Own Dwelling expressly excludes, in Section 3 a, for ordinary lettings of one's own dwelling.
The tenant may remain in the apartment with the rights of a first-hand tenant, including security of tenure under Chapter 12 of the Land Code.
In a straw-man arrangement – where a property owner lets apartments through a letting company acting as intermediary – does a subtenant enjoy the same rights as a direct (first-hand) tenant, and has the question been examined by the Supreme Court when the district court and the court of appeal agreed on the answer?
Since the database contains no direct statutory text on the straw-man assessment, I must proceed from a general principle of law: according to the well-known straw-man judgment of the Supreme Court cited in the article, and the case law it expresses, the actual tenancy agreement (identified by who in fact has use of the premises and who pays the rent) is to be given contractual effect between the real parties, and arrangements in which an intermediary is inserted solely to circumvent the protective provisions of the Tenancy Act – in particular the security of tenure under Chapter 12 of the Land Code – must not result in the tenant losing the protection that a direct tenancy would afford. In practical terms, this means that a subtenant in a straw-man arrangement may invoke the same rights as a first-hand tenant, including the right to remain in the premises when the intermediary's agreement is terminated. I wish to make clear that this is a principle-based line of reasoning, not a reproduction of any specific provision from the material provided.
The article stated that the couple "shall also pay the tenant's litigation costs in the district court and the court of appeal, totalling SEK 422,000", which creates the impression that the costs award covers the entire proceedings, including the court of appeal. This conflicts with the provided rule in Section 5 of Chapter 2 of the Private Letting Act (2026:772), under which each party to a tenancy dispute under the said provision bears its own litigation costs in the court of appeal. The correct formulation is therefore that the costs claim relates to the district court instance, while each party in the court of appeal normally bears its own costs; the assertion of a total award of SEK 422,000 extending to the court of appeal is thus inaccurate, or at least misleadingly incomplete.
For anyone operating, or advising property owners on, letting via letting companies, the principal risk is now concretely documented: a straw-man arrangement designed to circumvent the Tenancy Act means that each individual tenant can assert first-hand status, and a party terminating the intermediary's agreement does not, in effect, terminate the tenants' tenancies – as demonstrated here by the district court and court of appeal unanimously granting the tenant the right to remain in the premises, with the property owners ordered to pay SEK 422,000 in litigation costs. For tenants and their counsel, the argument is reinforced by the Supreme Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal, so that the court of appeal's application of the straw-man doctrine now constitutes a final, precedential starting point; in the pending tenancy tribunal case, in which the tenant has been given notice, it is therefore appropriate to invoke that the judgment affords him the same protection as a first-hand tenant, which – according to his counsel – improves his prospects before the tribunal. The concrete mistake to avoid is the assumption that notice given to the letting company ends the tenants' security of tenure – the formal structure of the arrangement yields to the real tenancy relationship.
Influence communication under the Act means that a natural or legal person has contact with a political decision-maker or a member of a political decision-maker's staff, with the purpose of influencing the preparation or decision in a matter before the Riksdag or the Government.
As of 1 July 2027, the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communication Aimed at Influencing Political Decisions enters into force, establishing registration and reporting obligations for those lobbying the Riksdag and the Government. The news is that the Riksdag has approved the register, but its scope became narrower than critics such as Annika Hirvonen of the Green Party had demanded. The legal question is therefore: which contacts fall within the notification and reporting obligation, and which fall outside it. Decisive is the definition in Section 2: influence communication means contact with a political decision-maker or that person's staff with the purpose of influencing the preparation or decision in a matter before the Riksdag or the Government, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome. The Act also covers providing, on commission, advice or support to someone who has or intends to have such contact (Section 2, second paragraph). Under Section 3, political decision-makers means members of the Riksdag and ministers; staff includes, among others, political secretaries, employees of the Riksdag Administration, state secretaries, political advisers, as well as special investigators and committee members appointed by the Government.
Application rests on two obligations: notification for registration with the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet), which is also the supervisory authority, and ongoing reporting under Section 8. The report under Section 9 must contain the subjects of the influence communication and, for each subject, the names of the political decision-makers with whom contact has taken place — or the ministry, unit, or committee for contact with staff — as well as the principal means of contact and the approximate extent of the contact. Where the communication has taken place on commission from another party, the commissioning party must be stated. A registered party who has only provided advice or support to another need not state these particulars, and under Section 10, a person who has not engaged in any influence communication during the period must also state this in the report. The Act contains clear exemptions: the notification obligation does not apply to, among other things, contacts with political parties holding mandates or their affiliated organisations, nor to customary contacts within the framework of administrative matters with authorities, nor to participation in working groups and inquiries appointed by the Government where participation is documented and the documentation is accessible to the public. Hirvonen's objection — that lobbying is often directed at agreements such as the Tidö Agreement or the January Agreement before the formal process begins — did not prevail, since the Act ties the notification obligation to the preparation or decision in a specific matter.
Organisations such as Tobaksfakta gain a tool for tracking which contacts tobacco lobbyists have had with members of the Riksdag, ministers, and their staff in matters under preparation or decision.