Correction. The article's central claim that "the current rules make it possible to prolong rent negotiations without any real consequences" is incomplete. The rules contain concrete consequences of the procedure: a decision of the Rent Tribunal under the Act (1978:304) may be appealed only within three weeks to the Svea Court of Appeal (Section 31), the right of action is forfeited if a dispute is not referred in time, and under the Land Code (1970:994), for example, a landlord's notice of termination is of no effect where the landlord fails to perform his obligations. More precisely, the article should formulate its criticism as being that these consequences are not attached to the prolongation of the negotiations themselves — there is no statutory negotiation period or automatic limitation on retroactive effect — rather than that consequences are entirely absent.
Under Section 24 of the same Act, both the landlord and the tenant, once negotiations have concluded without agreement, have the right to apply to the Rent Tribunal for an amendment of the rental terms.
A decision of the Rent Tribunal under the Rent Negotiation Act may be appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal within three weeks under Section 31.
When negotiations in Värmland reach a deadlock, the parties do not await a court decision but turn to the Rent Tribunal or an arbitrator, depending on which route is opened. This means that the rent may be determined with retroactive effect long after the start of the year, since no deadline in the regulatory framework compels a decision to be issued in good time. The precise legal question is when and how the rental terms may be amended once negotiations under the negotiation procedure have concluded without agreement. Decisive is the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304), in particular Section 24, which gives both the landlord and the tenant the right to apply to the Rent Tribunal for an amendment of the rental terms after negotiations have concluded. The alternative is arbitration: under Section 23 c of the same Act, the Act (2022:1657) on Dispute Resolution within the Framework of Certain Collective Rent Negotiations applies in the arbitrator's proceedings. The author of the article demands that Parliament reform precisely this system, including through a statutory right to refer disputes to an arbitrator without special agreements.
A negotiation procedure under Section 5 of the Rent Negotiation Act entails an obligation on the landlord to negotiate rent increases on its own initiative, unless the increase relates to an optional feature and does not exceed a price recommended by the parties.
For tenants: continued uncertainty as to the applicable rent during the negotiation period, with the risk of a retroactive increase once the tribunal or arbitrator decides.
Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138) provides that moderation shall be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers.
In the case against the credit broker Advea, an interim conditional fine totalling SEK 3.5 million was attached to the decision.
Svenska Postkodföreningen faces a main hearing before the Patent and Market Court in which the marketing of a single Instagram advertising film may be prohibited and subject to a conditional fine (vite), with the Consumer Ombudsman as plaintiff. The legal situation awaiting resolution is a commercial law prohibition case with an economic pressure function. The central legal question is whether the advertising contravenes the moderation requirement in Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138), which provides that moderation shall be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers. The Consumer Ombudsman further requests that the prohibition be combined with a conditional fine, the amount of which is tied to the lottery revenues of just over SEK 3.5 billion according to the 2025 annual report.
Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act requires moderation and prohibits marketing directed particularly at persons under 18 years of age; in this case, the first point is at issue.
For Postkodlotteriet, a prohibition against the individual advertising film is at stake, combined with a conditional fine whose level could become relatively high given the revenue base of just over SEK 3.5 billion.
In the event of such circumvention, the protective provisions apply directly between the parties, regardless of the formal chain of contracts.
The tenant may remain in the apartment with the same rights as a first-hand tenant, including protection against termination under Chapter 12 of the Land Code.
The tenant's legal position is now finally favorable: he may remain in the premises with the same rights as a first-hand tenant, since the Supreme Court refused Ibrahimovic and Seger leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeal's judgment therefore stands. For the property owners, the decision means that the termination of the lease cannot be enforced and that the dispute has been finally resolved on the merits. The legal core of the matter is the straw-man arrangement: whether the legal relationship has been used to circumvent the protective provisions of tenancy legislation. Decisive are the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Land Code concerning security of tenure and reasonable rent, which, in the courts' assessment, may not be circumvented through intermediaries and a community of interest between the property owners and the rental company. The underlying material also concerns the Act (1985:277) on Certain Straw-Man Arrangements, which demonstrates that straw-man arrangements may be examined by a district court in a dispute over ownership; here, the examination took place in a tenancy dispute over who is the landlord in the legal sense.
The district court found that the tenant has the same right vis-à-vis Ibrahimovic and Seger as if they had let the premises directly to him.
The Court of Appeal shared this assessment and further found a community of interest between Ibrahimovic and Seger, on the one hand, and the rental company, on the other.
The tenant relied on Supreme Court precedent and asserted that he had paid excessive rent within a straw-man arrangement that benefited the property owner.
May a subtenant in a sham (straw-man) arrangement, where the owner has let the property through a letting company in order to circumvent tenancy law, be treated as a direct tenant with full security of tenure – and does such a judicial assessment have guiding effect in the parallel Rent Tribunal proceedings concerning notice of termination?
As no direct statutory basis has been provided, I rely on a general principle of law: in sham arrangements, where the landlord uses an intermediary to conceal the fact that the tenancy is in substance directly between the owner and the final occupant, established practice affords the tenant the same status as a direct tenant under the tenancy provisions of the Land Code (Chapter 12 of the Land Code). This means that termination is possible only on the limited grounds applicable to direct tenants, and that a notice of termination served on the intermediary does not in itself extinguish the tenant's security of tenure. The Supreme Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal means that the Court of Appeal's application of this principle stands, but it is a general principle, not a concrete section reference from the source material, that supports the conclusion.
The source material shows that the District Court and the Court of Appeal uniformly found that the arrangement was a sham and that the tenant accordingly has the same rights as a direct tenant; the Supreme Court found no reason to grant leave to appeal, so the line of practice in this chain of instances is now final. The article further refers to a "much-discussed sham tenancy judgment" of the Supreme Court that the tenant invoked, indicating that the Supreme Court has previously established the same line. The case law on the concrete question is therefore consistent, insofar as the source material shows: the courts enforce the sham-arrangement principle even where the landlord is a private individual who has recently acquired the property.
The practical lesson is that court proceedings on the content of the tenancy and Rent Tribunal proceedings on the validity of a notice of termination are not isolated from one another: the Court of Appeal's final assessment that the tenant has direct-tenant status is now a strong argument in the pending Rent Tribunal case, since the Tribunal must then examine the notice against the stringent grounds applicable to direct tenants – not against the more liberal rules for subletting. For anyone letting property through a letting company, the risk is concrete: a notice of termination served on the intermediary does not reach the final occupant if the arrangement is classified as a sham, and the cost becomes not only the loss of the right of occupancy but also the opposing party's legal costs – here SEK 422,000 across two instances. Accordingly, upon acquiring a property with existing intermediary arrangements, a buyer should investigate the substance of the tenancies before serving notice, since formal correctness vis-à-vis the intermediary does not protect against a sham-arrangement finding.
The report shall be submitted to Kammarkollegiet no later than 1 June for the period January–April, no later than 1 October for the period May–August and no later than 1 February for the period September–December.
Lobbying communication within the meaning of the Act means that a natural or legal person has contact with a political decision-maker or a member of a political decision-maker's staff, with the aim of influencing the preparation or decision of a matter before the Riksdag or the Government, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome.
A limited transparency register awaits those who contact members of the Riksdag and government ministers for lobbying purposes: registration with the Swedish Companies Registration Office (Kammarkollegiet) and periodic reporting, but not until 1 July 2027. The news is that the Riksdag has approved the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communication Aimed at Influencing Political Decisions, which enters into force on 1 July 2027. The legal question the Act resolves is which communication constitutes reportable and disclosable lobbying communication, and who must then register. Under Section 2, it covers contact with a political decision-maker or the decision-maker's staff with the aim of influencing the preparation or decision of a matter before the Riksdag or the Government, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome. Also covered are engagements to provide advice or support to someone who has such contact. The Act does not, however, apply to contacts with no connection to a specific matter – precisely the limitation that Annika Hirvonen criticised.
The circle of decision-makers is defined in Section 3: members of the Riksdag and ministers, as well as staff members such as political secretaries, employees of the Riksdag Administration, state secretaries, political advisers and inquiry secretaries. The following obligations apply to the registered entity:
Certain exceptions limit these obligations: under the cited provisions of the Act, the registration obligation does not apply to ordinary contacts concerning public authority matters or to participation in government-appointed working groups and inquiries where the participation is documented and made public. Nor does the Act cover communication with political parties holding mandates, or with intergovernmental organisations within the framework of diplomatic relations. An entity that has only provided advice or support to another is exempt, under Section 9, from stating the particulars in the first paragraph, items 1 and 2. The source material contains no case law on the application of the Act; the legislation is new and has not yet entered into force.
For tobacco lobbyists and other business interests, the Act means that contacts with the Riksdag and the Government for matter-specific purposes become publicly visible through reports to Kammarkollegiet. For organisations such as Tobaksfakta, the register is a tool for tracking the tobacco industry's influence – but only within the formal preparatory and decision-making chain, not for informal inter-party agreements such as the Tidö Agreement, since such activity falls outside the definition in Section 2. The following groups are practically affected:
The source material specifies no sanctions for failure to register or report, so the consequences of non-compliance cannot be determined on the basis of the available material.