Legal prism — 2026-10-26

The decisive rules are found in Section 24 of the Rent Negotiation Act, which gives both the landlord and the tenant the right to apply to the rent tribunal for an amendment of the rent terms once the negotiation has concluded without agreement.

A decision of the rent tribunal under the Rent Negotiation Act may be appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal within three weeks pursuant to Section 31 of the Rent Negotiation Act.

Core issue

Tenants in Värmland are currently awaiting the resolution of a stalled rent negotiation by a rent tribunal or an arbitrator, as the parties have failed to reach agreement. The legal situation awaiting them is a review under the Rent Negotiation Act (1978:304), in which the timeframes are in practice governed by the parties' own initiatives rather than by statutory deadlines. The core legal question is which route a dispute over rent terms takes when the negotiation procedure yields no result, and who is then entitled to initiate a review. The same right applies where the negotiation was obstructed by circumstances not attributable to the party seeking the amendment.

Legal assessment

A negotiation procedure under Section 5 of the Rent Negotiation Act entails an obligation on the landlord to negotiate rent increases on its own initiative, subject to the exceptions set out in the Act (e.g. optional additions and rents within the recommended level).

• The tribunal may not consider a landlord's claim for a higher rent where no negotiation has taken place — this follows from Section 11 a of the Act (1973:188) concerning lease arbitration boards and rent tribunals; an exception applies where a negotiation has been requested but was obstructed by reasons outside the landlord's control.
• Where the parties in the negotiation procedure are in agreement, a dispute over rent terms may be referred to an arbitrator; the arbitrator's proceedings are governed by Section 23 c of the Rent Negotiation Act and the Act (2022:1657) on dispute resolution within the framework of certain collective rent negotiations.
• Organisations of property owners or tenants are not parties to proceedings under Section 22 of the Rent Negotiation Act, which affects who brings the action in tribunal proceedings.
• The opinion piece from Fastighetsägarna Värmland calls for legislative amendments: a statutory right for landlords to refer disputes to an arbitrator without special agreements, a limited negotiation period, and objective economic criteria. None of these reforms applies today under the provisions cited.
• The material contains no case law, so no precedents can be invoked.

Consequences

For tenants: continued uncertainty as to the applicable rent until the tribunal or arbitrator decides, with a risk of retroactive increases once the decision is issued.

• For property owners: unclear revenue for large parts of the year, which complicates the planning of operations, maintenance and investments.
• For the negotiating parties: Section 24 opens tribunal review to both sides after a failed negotiation, but the Act imposes no time limit on the negotiation stage itself — this is precisely the gap the article wants the legislator to close.
• The route via an arbitrator currently presupposes that the parties agree to it; absent agreement, the rent tribunal remains the available forum.

Under Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138), moderation shall be observed in the marketing of gambling to consumers.

In the case against the credit broker Advea, the Patent and Market Court attached an interim penalty payment totalling SEK 3.5 million to its decision.

Core issue

Svenska Postkodföreningen now awaits a procedural posture before the Patent and Market Court, in which the Consumer Ombudsman is seeking an injunction, subject to a penalty payment, against a single Instagram advertising video. What is genuinely at stake is not merely the advertisement itself, but a norm-setting examination of what the moderation requirement entails for gambling advertising on social media. The precise legal question is whether the video, featuring rain of winning cheques, gold-coloured text about SEK 101 million and a time-limited half-price offer, violates Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Gambling Act (2018:1138), which requires moderation in the marketing of gambling to consumers. The regulatory framework governing the matter consists of the Gambling Act and the Swedish Consumer Agency's general guidelines on the marketing of gambling (KOVFS 2025:2). Under the guidelines, an overall assessment is to be conducted, and the requirement covers the presentation itself, its content, and its design on the chosen medium.

Legal assessment

The CO's application for summons rests on two objections, both of which are supported by the guidelines:

• The lottery is presented as socially attractive, something everyone should take part in — the guidelines state that marketing should not convey the impression that gambling solves social or financial problems.
• The offer creates the impression of urgency to purchase a ticket — the guidelines on soliciting marketing (Section 2.2.2) target messages that may encourage an ill-considered decision.

The guidelines also contain an express norm that marketing must not give the appearance that the chances of winning are greater than they actually are, with examples such as claims that it is easy to win large sums. Gold-coloured winning text and falling money may be weighed in that assessment. The guidelines further require that the information be limited to facts about the lottery and presented as factually as possible. The case law is sparse, particularly with respect to social media. In autumn 2022, the Riksdag rejected the Government's proposal for an adjusted moderation requirement in the bill "En förstärkt spelreglering" (A Strengthened Gambling Regulation), on the grounds that case law was in the process of being established. The Swedish Consumer Agency's 2025 guidelines are merely guidelines; a court ruling carries greater weight. The CO is not publicly seeking a specified penalty amount, but refers to the Swedish Postcode Lottery's 2025 annual report, with ticket revenues of just over SEK 3.5 billion, as the basis for a relatively high penalty.

Consequences

If the court prohibits the marketing subject to a penalty payment, the sanction will fall directly on Svenska Postkodföreningen; the penalty ruling may become a reference point for the entire gambling industry's social media advertising.

• A norm-setting decision would fill the gap left by the Riksdag's rejection in 2022 and have an impact far beyond the individual advertiser, in line with previous marketing cases.
• For licence holders, the requirement entails limiting information to factual matters, avoiding time pressure and soliciting messages, and not presenting winnings as socially attractive.
• The Swedish Postcode Lottery must now respond to the CO's objections before the court.

Correction. The news report reproduces the District Court's conclusion — that the tenant has the same rights against the property owners as in the case of a direct letting — but fails to mention the necessary precondition for that finding: that there is a community of interest between the property owner and the grantor of the lease, which is the first condition under Chapter 12, Section 47 a of the Land Code. It was precisely this circumstance that the Court of Appeal expressly found in relation to the letting company. The correct formulation is therefore that the tenant obtains the same position against the property owner only where both a community of interest and a circumvention of the rules protecting the tenant may be assumed to exist — not merely on the basis of a circumvention.

Core issue

The legal position of Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Helena Seger is now final: the tenant may remain in the premises with the same status as a direct first-hand tenant, as the Supreme Court refused them leave to appeal. The practical outcome is that their termination of the lease cannot be enforced against the tenant. The legal question was whether an arrangement through a rental company could be used to circumvent the tenant's security of tenure and right to a reasonable rent. The decisive provision is Chapter 12 of the Swedish Land Code, which contains the rules on security of tenure and the tenant's preferential rights. The courts applied the principle that where a legal relationship is exploited to circumvent protective provisions, the tenant is treated as if the lease had been granted directly by the true principal.

Legal assessment

The Stockholm District Court stated in its judgment that "it may be assumed that the legal relationship has been exploited to circumvent provisions in tenancy legislation that are for the benefit of N.N." The couple appealed, but the Court of Appeal upheld the line taken. The Court of Appeal attached weight to the existence of a community of interest between Ibrahimovic and Seger, on the one hand, and the rental company, on the other, in relation to the tenant. By virtue of this community of interest, the nominee arrangement — under which the tenant allegedly paid an excessive rent — was deemed a means of circumventing the legislation on security of tenure and reasonable rent. The source material refers to established Supreme Court practice in this field. Nominee arrangements are otherwise governed by the Act (1985:277) on Certain Nominee Arrangements, section 8 of which provides that cases are heard by the district court where the nominee is to answer in a dispute concerning ownership. In this case, however, it was not ownership but the content of the lease that was examined, and the protective rules of Chapter 12 of the Land Code are therefore applied directly to the relationship between the parties.

• The tenant has the same rights against Ibrahimovic and Seger as if they had granted the lease to him directly.
• The termination by the property owners is without effect to the extent that it would deprive the tenant of security of tenure.
• Any excessive rent paid may, at the tenant's claim, be subject to repayment, which the source material suggests through his reference to excessive rent.

Consequences

Ibrahimovic and Seger must accept the tenant as remaining in residence with the rights of a first-hand tenant; eviction through enforcement is not possible on the basis of the termination that was examined.

• The tenant may at a later stage demand repayment of the alleged excessive rent, if he pursues that issue separately.
• Rental companies connected to property owners cannot expect nominee arrangements to shield them from the rules on security of tenure; a community of interest pierces the arrangement.
• For the market in private residential letting, the outcome confirms that the Act (2012:978) on the Letting of One's Own Dwelling and Chapter 12 of the Land Code provide the tenant with strong protection, since section 2 of that Act renders terms disadvantageous to the tenant ineffective.

Whether a subtenant in a sham (bulvan) arrangement — where the property owner rents out via a rental agency in order to circumvent the Tenancy Act — is to be treated as a direct tenant with full security of tenure when the intermediate landlord is given notice, and whether the Supreme Court's refusal of leave to appeal confirms this assessment.

Legal basis: The source material contains no direct statutory text, so the reasoning rests on a general principle of law: the so-called bulvan (sham intermediary) doctrine, established in Supreme Court case law, provides that where a landlord uses an intermediary (a sham) to rent out a property in the second tier and thereby circumvents the protective provisions of the Tenancy Act, the tenancy agreement between the sham intermediary and the ultimate tenant may be equated with a direct first-tier lease with the property owner. The purpose is that the party who is in substance the landlord shall not be able to invoke the formal intermediate link to escape the statutory security of tenure — the tenant thereby obtains the same rights as if the agreement had been concluded directly with the party owning and controlling the property.

What case law says: The case law in the matter is consistent: the district court found that the couple had let the property through an intermediary in a sham arrangement and had thereby sought to circumvent the Tenancy Act; the court of appeal upheld the judgment in its entirety — including costs of SEK 422,000 — and the Supreme Court found no reason to grant leave to appeal, signalling that the question is not considered doubtful. The practice thus follows the well-known Supreme Court sham-intermediary judgment that the tenant had invoked as early as in the statement of claim.

Practical significance: The decision makes the sham-intermediary argument a powerful tool in similar disputes: a tenant who has rented via a rental agency can now rely on a finally established line of authority equating them with a direct tenant, which, according to their counsel, strengthens their position in the parallel proceedings before the Rent Tribunal in which they have been given notice — since notice from a "sub-landlord" lacking first-tier status is in substance ineffective against a person enjoying full security of tenure. Anyone purchasing or otherwise acquiring a rental property with a sham arrangement behind it should expect existing tenants to claim direct-tenant status and that litigation may end with an award of full legal costs; serving notice on the intermediate landlord in the hope thereby of getting rid of all tenants is a documented losing strategy. Worth following is the Rent Tribunal's forthcoming decision, which will show how much weight the judgment carries in an independent assessment of the notice.

Under Section 8, the registered person must submit reports to Kammarkollegiet three times per year: no later than 1 June (January–April), 1 October (May–August) and 1 February (September–December).

On 1 July 2027, the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communication Intended to Influence Political Decisions enters into force, and lobbyists targeting the Riksdag and the Government must then register with Kammarkollegiet, which also serves as the supervisory authority.

Core issue

On 1 July 2027, the Act (2026:1459) on Transparency in Communication Intended to Influence Political Decisions enters into force, and lobbyists targeting the Riksdag and the Government must then register with the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet), which also serves as the supervisory authority. For tobacco lobbyists and other interest organisations, this entails a periodic reporting obligation with public transparency as its purpose — not a prohibition or an approval requirement. The legal question the Act answers is what qualifies as reportable "influence communication" — and where the boundary of the register lies. Under Section 2, it covers contact with a political decision-maker or that person's staff with the aim of influencing the preparation or decision in a matter before the Riksdag or the Government, in order to promote a particular interest or outcome; assignments to advise or support someone engaged in such contact are also covered. Under Section 3, political decision-makers include Members of the Riksdag and ministers; staff include, inter alia, political secretaries, employees of the Riksdag Administration, State Secretaries, political advisers, as well as inquiry secretaries and committee members appointed by the Government.

Legal assessment

The report under Section 9 must state the subjects of the influence communication and, for each subject, the names of the political decision-makers with whom contact occurred, or information on the ministry, unit or committee of the staff contacted, as well as the principal means of contact and the approximate extent of the contact.

• Where the communication was carried out on behalf of another party, this must be stated, with information on the principal pursuant to Section 6, second paragraph, items 1 and 2; however, a person who has only provided advice or support to another is exempt from these particulars.
• Under Section 10, even a person who has conducted no influence communication during the period must state this — so-called nil reporting.
• The reporting obligation does not apply, pursuant to the exception provisions, to, inter alia, customary contacts within the framework of official administrative matters, participation in working groups or inquiries appointed by the Government where such participation is documented, contacts with intergovernmental organisations within the framework of diplomatic relations, and political parties holding mandates or their affiliated organisations.
• The register complements the existing transparency regulation: the Act (1996:810) on the Registration of Members of the Riksdag's Assignments and Financial Interests allows the Riksdag Administration to maintain the economic register of members' assignments and interests. The source material contains no case law applying the new Act, as it has not yet entered into force.
• The Riksdag has rejected demands for a more comprehensive register (inter alia advanced by Annika Hirvonen, MP), which would also have covered contacts not linked to a specific decision, e.g. influence over inter-party agreements such as the Tidö Agreement.

Consequences

For interest organisations and agencies lobbying the Riksdag and the Government, the Act entails a continuous administrative obligation: registration with Kammarkollegiet, quarterly reports stating the names of decision-makers contacted or their units, and nil reporting for periods without lobbying.

• For tobacco-prevention actors such as Tobaksfakta, the register creates a tool for making the tobacco industry's contacts with decision-makers visible — but only for such communication as aims to influence the preparation or decision in a specific matter.
• Influence outside the formal process — e.g. inter-party agreements before the legislative process is set in motion — remains outside the register, since the more comprehensive alternative was voted down in the Riksdag.
• Those exempted are parties holding mandates and their affiliated organisations, which limits transparency regarding party-affiliated influence communication.
• Sanctions for failure to report or for inaccurate reporting are not apparent from the source material provided and therefore cannot be set out here.